

*A. S. Kolesnikov***ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: COMPELLED REFLECTION**

The article deals with the history of analytic philosophy which involved periods when the importance of metaphysics was rejected, along with speculative philosophy and an accent was placed on the analysis of the language. The analytical tradition always presumed western philosophy as something self-evident. Until recently disputes on the importance of history of philosophy for analysts had not arisen. It not especially favored. However, the possibility of losing the self-reflection of analytic philosophy, the probability of losing the analysis of one's own foundation in the mirror of other traditions, having somewhat other grounds than analytics, brought special attention to the history of philosophy. Compelled reflection revealed not only its attitude towards continental philosophy, but also threw light both on its success and its shortcomings. The strengthened work on an origin of analytical philosophy for the purpose of replacement of the developed myth with historical truth has begun. Now there are disputes concerning the term of interpretation «analytical philosophy» and the thinkers it involves. A problem is that is difficult to make exact definition of “analytical philosophy” as it is not so much a specific doctrine as a liberal range of approaches to problems. The problem was to find a method of classification of analytical philosophers or to sort out their relations to the thought movement which history makes analytical tradition. Gradually for analysts it became clear that programs of analytical philosophy have replaced each other because the latent metaphysical assumptions lying in their basis have changed. The history of the historical-philosophical discussion of a problem is offered also by the given paper. Refs 31.

Keywords: analytic philosophy, logicism, the analysis of the language, Frege, Russell, linguistic turning, Wittgenstein, Quine, Dummett, Hacker, Rorty.

*A. С. Колесников***АНАЛИТИЧЕСКАЯ ФИЛОСОФИЯ: ВЫНУЖДЕННАЯ РЕФЛЕКСИЯ**

В статье рассматривается история аналитической философии, в которой был период отрицания важности метафизики, неприятия спекулятивной философии и акцент на анализе языка. В западной философии аналитическая традиция всегда признавалась как нечто само собой разумеющееся. До недавнего времени споров о значимости истории философии для аналитиков не возникало. Ее не особенно жаловали. Однако возможность потери саморефлексии аналитической философии, вероятность утраты анализа собственных оснований в зеркале других традиций, стоящих на иных основаниях, чем аналитики, акцентировали особое внимание к истории философии. Вынужденная рефлексия показала не только ее отношение к континентальной философии, но и высветила как собственные успехи, так и недостатки. Началась усиленная работа над происхождением аналитической философии с целью замены сложившегося мифа исторической истиной. В настоящее время идут споры относительно интерпретации термина «аналитическая философия» и мыслителей, к ней причастных. Проблема в том, что трудно дать точное определение «аналитической философии», поскольку это не столько специфическая доктрина, сколько свободная связь подходов к проблемам. Задача была найти метод классификации аналитических философов или выяснить их отношение к движению мысли, история которой составляет аналитическую традицию. Постепенно для самих аналитиков становилось ясным, что программы аналитической философии сменяли друг друга потому, что изменялись скрытые метафизические допущения, лежащие в их основе. Историю историко-философского обсуждения проблемы и предлагает данная статья. Библиогр. 31 назв.

Ключевые слова: аналитическая философия, логицизм, анализ языка, Фреге, Рассел, лингвистический поворот, Витгенштейн, Куайн, Даммит, Хакер, Рорти.

Колесников Анатолий Сергеевич — доктор философских наук, профессор, Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, Российская Федерация, 199034, Санкт-Петербург, Университетская наб., 7–9, kolesnikov1940@yandex.ru

Kolesnikov Anatoly S. — Doctor of Philosophy, Professor, St Petersburg State University, 7–9, Universitetskaya nab., St. Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation

© Санкт-Петербургский государственный университет, 2017

The history of analytic philosophy of the XXth century is distinguished for its exclusive inventiveness, the compilation of its movements by schools, the speed of spreading their influence and the impulse of their flourishing, the change of spheres of the application of its sets of instruments and its relation to metaphysics. “Logicism”, “reductionism”, “physicalism”, “pragmatism”, “naturalism” and other “isms” were also dealt with in this history. The problems which were to be solved in those schools were quite different, but still they remained the adherents of analysis treated by different ways.

In Western philosophy the analytic tradition has always been acknowledged as something that goes without saying. It has been unfolded beginning with Plato and Aristotle as Bertrand Russell says, and he shows that in his “History of Western Philosophy”. Till recently, there haven’t been observed any discussions on the importance of the history of philosophy for analytics. It has not been especially granted. If according to positivists, metaphysics does not exist, its history does not exist either. Analytic philosophy in its youth was hostile by intuitively both with the historical philosophical also with their systematization. However, the possibility of losing self-reflection of analytic philosophy, the probability from suffering a loss from analysis of one’s own bases as reflected in the other traditions, having somewhat other bases than analytics, accentuated special attention to the history of philosophy. Hard work on the origin of analytic philosophy has started for the purpose of replacing the established myth by a historical truth [1]. The logic of the development of the XX century philosophy itself gave rise to the searching nerve of culture and the essence of philosophy, which was born in its frames, that very inner logic of unfolding its senses on some definite grounds. Paying attention to the complicate character of reality, the analytics were obligated to evaluate estimate their achievements not only in the language, but also in the philosophy itself, in metaphysics. The “analytics” themselves write about in the “A Companion on the Analytic Philosophy” in quite a convincing manner, where 39 philosophers of the XX century are presented [2].

Bertrand Russell in his 2nd book on the History of Philosophy “Wisdom of the West” tries to show off inseparability and non-confluence of the poles on intellectual culture — mutual additionality of studies, inclined to certain systematic combination, i.e. to analytic philosophy, and the other hand — no chance to bring the author’s opinion to these very analytics. Here reveals the necessity in active, permanent dialogue, continuously connected with history, struggle against the relativistic dissolution of thought in the element of time and culture. His intention and his result proved to contradict each other, though to some extent they showed the history of the formation of analytic methodology in the history of philosophy.

R. Carnap on the pages of journal «*Erkenntnis*» declares, that philosophizing begins as a kind emotional search and so it is finishes taring a form, kindred with musical feeling. And only logical analysis of the language of humanities can become the mode of revival of philosophy both as a method and its contents. K. Hempel persistently said on the futility of traditional philosophy and the history of philosophy. Philosophers can’t promote their theories; at the best they can explain some ordinary use of the language showing its diapason and flexibility and dissipating obstacles, arising while theorizing on our experiment. That is how an ordinary analysis of the language entailed oblivion of the tradition of philosophy — as — wisdom.

H. Feigl, Ph. Frank, A. J. Ayer and others, who were nearer to logical positivism, soon began denying abandon to interpret philosophical questions as “pseudo problems” and

announced some curious ideas about searching the ways of theoretical comprehension of historic-philosophical process. Lots of problems demand answers. How can one talk — quite well- grounded- on the non-existent? How can one in strict succession deny, that something exists? How is it possible for two true veritable identical proposals differ by their meaning? These questions despite of their ancient origin became the focus in the works of G. Frege, B. Russell, S. Kripke, W. Quine et al. In the one hand — when in the history of philosophy formation and functioning of some separate notions of outlook are being elucidated with philosophical discursions in different traditions of culture and history. On the other hand — It is the birth and flavoring of analytic philosophy. Nowadays there are discussions concerning the interpretation of the term “analytic philosophy” and thinkers involved in it. The problem was born of the difficulties to give the exact determination name to “analytic philosophy”, as it is not so much scientific doctrine as free connection to treat the problems. This is a general title for a kind of analytic thought, practiced during the first half of the XXth century, first in Great Britain and German-speaking countries, and later in North America and Australasia, using “conceptual analysis” when dividing complicated notions into more ordinary components.

The term itself was first used by Gustav Bergmann (1906–1987) in 1945, which differing it from “philosophical analysis”. The term began enjoying popularity in 1960ees (just then anthologies and monographs under the same title started appearing) and was already associated not only with neo-positivistic logic-epistemological analysis but also with Wittgensteinian analysis of natural language and also with the belief that it is Wittgenstein keeps the key to discovering philosophical problems (while logical positivists rejected them). It is this interpretation of the term that was worked out by M. Dummett, who considered G. Frege (with his famous distinguishing between meaning and sense), but not B. Russell and G. E. Moore¹ was the founder of “analytic philosophy”. G. Frege considerably increased expressive authority of logic, and Fregean's aspects are found in transcendental logic of Kant [3, p. 17].

Ray Monk accepted similar point of view [4, p. 11–12] and criticizes M. Dummett's expression, that “the only route to the analysis of thought passes across the analysis of language” [5, p. 28]. In that case Russell's unfriendliness to some ordinary language would exclude him from the class of analytic philosophers. But the characteristic of analytic philosophy as philosophy devoting itself to analysis, leads at any rate to still worse classification. According to Monk, “later” Wittgenstein doesn't believe in analysis. In this case Monk doesn't offer opposition between “analytic” and “phenomenological”² or “continental” philosophy, but between “analytical” and “Wittgensteinian” philosophy. In this case where are the philosophers like Heidegger, Collingwood or Derrida? And even if we determine, that the main opposition only is between “analytic” and “non-analytic” philosophers, then how shall we understand the pre-history of the philosophy of the XXth century? Of course, it is worth reminding that “analytical philosophy” includes some obligation to analysis, but philosophy also used the method earlier, so philosophers like Locke

¹ Generally speaking, Thomas Hurka puts Moore in the middle of the tradition, stretching from predecessors — like Sidgwick, Rashdall, Brentano and McTaggart and successors including Prichard, C. D. Broad, Ross, Ewing and Europe, Meinong and Nicolai Hartmann [6].

² Swiss philosopher G. Kung when comparing semantic terminology (of the theory of reference), formed by Russell and Frege, and corresponding terminology of phenomenological philosophy, comes to the conclusion about well-known parallelism between viewpoints of Anglo-Saxon logic-philosophical analysis and “continental” phenomenology.

and Hume are considered as “analytic” ones. Therefore, the term “analytic philosophy” is used nowadays in such a diversity that it lost its definitude.

“Analytic” philosophy Dagfinn Follesdal takes the 2nd echoes can be characterized neither in the terms of doctrines or problems, or genetically, as a historical tradition, or as based on the method of “conceptual analysis”. Rather, what distinguishes them is “the mode to draw nearer to philosophical problems”, — the way to accentuate the argument and the testimony aiming at clearness, unity and “reflective balance”. Then many philosophers of “the threshold of pre XX century” look like “analytical” ones. He also is against separating contemporary philosophy into “analytic” and “continental” ones, and offers another approach in reality there exist different schools, those of phenomenology, hermeneutics, neo-Thomism, naturalism and so on, which can be studied by “more or less analytic method” [7, p. 4, 10–11, 14]. It’s never clear whether the classification of analytic and continental philosophy is mutually exclusive. If distinction is incompatible then it is in some sense impossible, because both Heidegger and Derrida use the method of analysis [8]. It is also demonstrated by commentators, seeing the continuity of analyzable problems between, say, Derrida and Davidson [8], or between Heidegger and Quine [Matthews 2003] and general importance of the historical figures, like Descartes, Aristotle and Kant [9]. One can agree with Follesdal, that there isn’t any considerable collection or methods that could give any unique definition to “analytic philosophy”. Otherwise the characteristic of “analytical philosophy” would have excluded — genetically- lots of thinkers, despite their merits.

Two was test recent discussions of the nation presented P. M. S. Hacker [10] and in Hans Sluga’s review on the book by Hacker. Hacker gives a short survey of the modern usage of the notion and offers a number of distinctions like between logical and conceptual analysis between reductive and constructive ones. His solving means that the term “analysis” “signifies... decomposition of something into its elements” [11, p. 119–121]. Sluga after careful estimation of different historical variants considers it hopeless to define the essence of analytic philosophy. Moreover, it shouldn’t be designated as a monolithic tradition with clear-cut set of beliefs: “like any other philosophic tradition it is in reality a field of overlapping and moving aside discourses” [12, p. 19]. Thus when analyzing the philosophy of Frege Sluga considers that him to be marked a developing thinker standing on the ideas of neo-Kantian movement. The translation of Frege’s works into English resulted in revaluating his place in the development of analytic philosophy. Michael Dummett (1993) considers him a criterion of contemporary analytic philosophy. Though it is disputable, that Frege all by himself solved lots of problems, discovered by Russell and Moore [13]. It is out-of-the question, that his works possess lots of qualities, connected with analytic philosophy, including the direction of the analysis, its strictness and depth [14].

As for Peter Hacker, in his works [15; 16] he designates phases of analytical philosophy, in order to avoid the absurdity of simplified characteristics of Monk and Follesdal. Hacker divides “analytical philosophy” into Four phases, each of them answering definite kind of analysis. *The first phase* is defined by Moore’s method of conceptual analysis and by Russell’s being busy with logical analysis, who, having introduced the theory of descriptions, revealed space between grammar and logical forms of sentences and inspired reductionist program in philosophy (after noted in the slogan, «Everywhere where it is necessary to replace probably, logic designs with the deduced objects»). *The second phase* signifies open “linguistic turn” of Wittgenstein in the “*Tractatus*”, which led to the — so —

called Cambridge School of analysis of 1920ees — 1930ees, practiced by Ramsey, Wisdom and L. S. Stebbing. *The third phase*, going from Wittgenstein and his conversations with the members of Vienna circle, was the rise of logical positivism with his accent on the distinction between the analytic and synthetic, principle of verification and refusal from the metaphysics in favor of methodological empiricism, with Carnap and Ayer as advanced defenders. *The fourth phase* refers to the post-war period Oxford “linguistic philosophy”, influenced by later Wittgenstein, his being busy with “therapeutic” and “connecting” forms of analysis as is shown in the works, e.g. of Waisman, Ryle, Austin and Strawson.

Now it is possible to discuss quite some a detail of history about which speaks Hacker, or to call in question to its division into these four phases. Hacker in his phases underestimates quite seriously the role of Frege in history and the influence of the events in logic and mathematics at the turn of the XIX- beginning of the XXth centuries. But the main thing is approach aiming at understanding history since Hacker considers it the only way to answer the question “What is analytic philosophy?” [15, p. 56]. The taste was to find the method of classification of analytic philosophers or to examine their attitude towards the movement of thought the history of which constitutes analytic tradition. At any rate just an attempt to identify “analytic philosophy” by one definite thesis can lead to the excluding hart well-known practical figures or to including lots of preceding philosophers before the twentieth century (if the thesis is defined as too general one) from this very cluster. Those facts are persuasively revealed by Nikolay Milkov [16].

In his book Hacker even says about the decline of analytic philosophy expressing of the concerning the growth of new and harmful forms of “scientific philosophy”. Surely, the obituary on analytic philosophy does not correspond with reality, which is witnessed in the works of analytics [17]. The confirmation of the strengthening of “analytic philosophy” as well as of Frege’s importance for analytic tradition is demonstrated in volume XIII of the series, which entitled “*Frege: Importance and Legacy*” [18]. This luxurious collection of articles demonstrates the importance of Frege, starting since the philosophy of language for the preceding philosophy of mathematics, the role of Frege’s logicism and solving semantic, epistemological and ontological problems. Though under the influence of Moore and knowledge, acquired from Peano Russell began to develop systematically the program of analysis. Rediscovering modern logic of predicates helped him (Russell 1905). Similar logic was developed in Middle Ages, but its discovery in modern form is usually ascribed to Frege (1879) and (irrespectively) to Peirce (1885).

In the 1960ees — 1970ees there was a transition from the analysis of language to “rehabilitation of metaphysics”, and that was the empiricism of Vienna Circle, which lead to it. Culmination of changes goes on thanks to Quine. Earlier, in 1948 at the meeting of Aristotelean society professor of Oxford University Hampshire St. made a speech “are all philosophical questions — questions of language?” where he answered the put question negatively. Later member of Vienna Circle F. Waisman will declare that “the statement — metaphysics is senseless — is senseless itself”. The destructive criticism of neo-positivism both from within and from outside lead to the fact that metaphysical problems entered into analytical philosophy and acquired unusual for it width of problematic field [19]. Von Nagl L. and Davidson D. characterized sympathy for contemporary non-analytical Continentally-European discourse as post-analytical tendency. Contemporary researches of this trend admit that philosophers of the past worked out really metaphysical problems with elements of analytics (with Hume, Locke and especially Kant). As soon as metaphys-

ics again became dignified, the analysts felt themselves confident in investigating a great variety of problems by lots of ways. “Rational reconstruction” of the previous doctrines was summoned to be panacea for revealing rational situations and including them into the context of philosophy. Gradually it was getting clear for the analysts themselves, that the programs of analytic philosophy replaced one another, because secret metaphysical assumptions, being on their basis, also changed.

Quine's arguments, that there isn't any principal difference between analytic and synthetic statements, there is only a special case of a broader thesis, that a language and therefore a thought are extremely indeterminate. Let's make note that Tugendhat E. in his lectures in Heidelberg, 1970, with the help of checking his previous decisions of principal philosophic tasks of analytic philosophy came to the conclusion that it preserved its main philosophical problems and discusses it much deeper than traditional philosophy as it got free from dogmatic presentations, restraining its development.

Changing the directions of analysts' investigations favors reinterpreting the “meaning and sense” of the very essence of the notion. Consequently, analytic philosophy is defined as philosophical style, which is distinguished by exceptional attention to the exact and detailed analysis of notion, linguistic problems, and humanities, and keeping aloof from their “inaccurate” discussion. The essential feature of the period — since 1970es — has been the interest of analytic philosophers to the bases of empirical sciences — from physics and biology and up to psychology, their use and contribution to artificial intellect and to cognitive science. At that time there is seen the turn of a number of analysts to the history of philosophy. Let's mark the works by Strawson P. and Jonathan Bennett on Kant, Bennett on Locke, Berkeley and Hume, and Bernard Williams and Margaret Wilson on Descartes. The list can be continued. The history of philosophy following B. Russell, H. Reichenbach, e.g. at J. Passmore is presented the struggle of metaphysical (speculative) and critical (analytic) traditions, with men-metaphysicians resting upon spontaneous intuition, and philosophers-critics — in logic. W. Stegmüller brings all this circle of problems in the history of philosophy to analytic ones.

Analytic philosophy got pluralistic one which promoted radical re-comprehending the chronology and genesis of analytic philosophy. Stages at its development are considerably enlarged in comparing on with the adapted stages (since logical atomism of the first decades of the XX century and up to post-linguistic philosophy of last decades of the same century). As early as in antiquity there worked the method of search with the help of analysis. It is not alien either to ancient Indian or to old Chinese philosophy. Analytical philosophy as intercultural reality will appear in front of us as a kind of dialogic philosophy, with its phylogenetic wordings, formed by cultural areas and chronological phases.

Analysts' underestimation of the history of philosophy and of continental³ philosophy gave birth to the idea, that the thinker needn't be a historian. Students of American Universities of the 60es — 70es of the XXth century were suggested that they should study not the history philosophy, but “solving philosophical problems” [20, p. 215]. Summing up the analytic philosophy of the mid — XXth century Rorty R. complained that it is a variant of Kantian philosophy, dealing with the discussion of linguistic, but not mental representation, and with the philosophy of language. Wittgenstein, Dewey, Quine and Davidson for Rorty — are heroes of the struggle against “scientific” analytic philoso-

³ Continental philosophy seems to pay the same. Thus, the VIII issue of continental philosophy [21] doesn't even mention analytic philosophy, which has flourished so splendidly on the continent.

phy, against its universalistic claims. Those philosophers propagandized “edification” and working out of private philosophical language, but not analysis. J. Lewis and D. Davidson — both are representatives of the genre of philosophic works, distinguishing from analytical tradition. Rorty himself tries to hoist Quine’s and Davidson’s new values instead of the old values of Moore and Russell. “The linguistic turn” in philosophy, according to Rorty, allowed — speaking with the words of Wittgenstein — “to cast away the stairs (of fundamentalism) after we had climbed up stairs and to scrutinize not only philosophy, but also culture through the sum of linguistic practices and relations. Unhistoricism of analytic philosophy, however, didn’t prevent the investigation of the history of philosophy, just as struggle against metaphysics didn’t withdraw it from analytic philosophy [22].

At the end of the 70es professional philosophers-analysts changed their attitude to the history of their discipline. In the first place the tendency to analyze the past of philosophy from platform of contemporary ideas was being disputed, which lead to oblivion or negation as pseudo-philosophical everything which was not in accordance with contemporaneity. The argumentation was taking place among the historians of ideas, analysts and scholars about specify and correlation of two methods in the history of philosophy and science- of rational and historical reconstructions correspondingly. The first one comes forward with the help of the method of comprehending and interpreting conceptions of the past in the terms of philosophy contemporary for the analyst. In this case great philosophers of the past appear as “colleagues and partners in conversation, with whom one can exchange opinions and arguments freely” [23, p. 49]. Investigations of Russell on Leibniz, of Strawson on Kant, of Dummett on Frege can be taken as examples of such reconstruction. The alternative to the similar “study of the past” can be serve historical reconstruction. Its adherents (Q. Skinner, A. MacIntyre, Ch. Taylor, J.B. Schneewind, R. Campbell) maintain paramount meaning of the history of philosophy and the barest necessity of its unprejudiced comprehending for mastering philosophizing by acceptable means and set of tools. W. Sellars wrote: “The history of philosophy — it’s lingua franca of some kind, universal means of communication, without which philosophers (at any rate who adhere to different opinions) cannot do. Philosophy without the history of philosophy would be deal, blind and dumb” [3, p. 1].

Continental philosophy desires — and often quite impatiently — to destroy the boundaries between philosophy, intellectual history, literature, literary criticism and the criticism of culture. Tom Sorell thinks that in some areas philosophy takes the form of the history of philosophy. Thus, in France, Germany and a number of other countries philosophical commentaries on thinkers or philosophical views of the past are often published. This tradition contains carefully thought over interpretations of thinkers, since antiquity and Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger. This tradition is alien to the majority of philosophers in English-speaking world, because they as analysts are hostile against textual commentary. It is known, that Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel acted like peacemakers among analysts and Europeans and tried to show that the demands of each groups were compatible.

Can the history of philosophy find place in analytic philosophy? If the history of philosophy includes intellectual using works of the past in order to consider problems of the present — then analytic philosophy needs it. But if the history of philosophy touches upon the interpretation and other explanation of certain canon or broadening it, then the connection with analytic philosophy is not so clear. the connection between analytic philosophy and antiquarian history of philosophy is more unclear, as it accentuates the status of

a philosophical text as one document among other ones from a distant intellectual world. It tries to make our acquaintance with that world in order to comprehend the document, but not to solve philosophical problems; probably it will regard socio-economic and scientific context of philosophical work and will identify problems, which were of importance for its author and were destined for the audience of those times. To escape mistakes, the history of philosophy should be written by peoples, educated as analytic philosophers — Sorell is firmly sure of it [24, p. 3].

What follows from the above is seen from Strawson's work. In "The Bounds of Sense" (1966) he does not merely examine Kant's "Criticism of Pure Reason" (*Kritik der Reinen Vernunft*) but also introduces his own world outlook. Strawson doesn't give general characteristic of traditional metaphysics, but enumerates some doctrines, which Kant himself entitles (concerning non-material soul, the structure and existence of space and God's existence). Strawson examines Kant's project from the point of view of the mid-XXth century familiar idiom of searching "the principle of meaning" [25, p. 16] and shows to us what attitude is of some selected parts of Kant's text to his own outlook [25, p. 95].

Richard Rorty continues the tradition. His "Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature" according to Hatfield, — is a curious combination of historical method and historical caricature [25, p. 98]. That is an ambitious attempt to use history oriented on the context for philosophical purposes and an attempt to diagnose central mistakes of Western philosophy (as far as metaphysics and epistemology are concerned) since Plato and so forth, concentrating on Descartes, Locke and Kant. "Historical method" of Rorty dissolves the history of philosophy in philosophy which is comprehended as a game with metaphors and words, as a genre of literature. Rorty is busy not so much with analyzing and describing, as with arbitrarily-poetical interpretation and re-describing philosophical theories of the past, corresponding to his form of reflexing. In the frames of neo-pragmatism Rorty tries to synthesize the ideas of analytical philosophy and classical philosophy of pragmatism, using hermeneutics, philosophy of language and so on, which gave an opportunity to designate this fact as a turning-point to the philosophy of post-modernism [26].

Lately in the course 30 years there were published a number of important works on the history of analytic philosophy. When discussing the problems touching upon real philosophers, Kripke Saul was a success. Sluga Hans is attempting to correct the historically distorted picture by Frege [12], offered by Michael Dummett (1973). There are wonderful investigations on Moore by Th. Baldwin (1990) and on Russell by P. Hylton (1990), and by N. Griffin (1991); Coffa Alberto presented a useful history of what he calls "semantic tradition", the same way as well-informed in the field of philosophy both Wittgenstein and Russell Ray Monk. M. Dummett gave a circumstantial analysis of Frege's historical development of logicism [5]. There are other contributions, deepening our comprehension of nature and of the origin of analytic philosophy, and witnessing the diapason and the riches of the work which is continued in his field.

Hegelian thought in analytic philosophy, taken by John McDowell and Robert Brandom deserve peculiar mentioning. They have found out in Hegel the ideas that are able to examine problems, which haunt the analytic tradition [27; 28]. Thus, Brandom assimilates Hegel to the tradition in logic, creating general landscape, where those two in outward appearance unlike types of philosophy can meet — the landscape, which Brandom names inferentialist theory with semantic content. Paul Redding traces the consequences of the displacement of the logic presupposed by Kant and Hegel by modern post-Fregean logic

and examines the events within the twentieth-century analytic philosophy which have made possible re-engagement of the connection analytic with the philosophy of Hegel [29]. Jonathan Cohen believes that contradictory and innovatory ideas of analysts do not prevent dialogue from developing from its saturation quality, many-sidedness when they include actual problems and acute arguments and theories, known to criticism, because all these witness vitality and the internal power of analytic philosophy. It is connected not by doctrinal and methodological unity, but by certain *type of normative problems* concerning bases and judgements, solving the principal problems on the ground of relation constructions [30].

So far as the history of philosophy deals with outstanding thinkers, how shall we in this case evaluate the possibilities of “immorality” for analytic philosophers? Frege, Russell, Moore, Carnap, Lewis, Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin, Hempel, Quine, Davidson, Putnam — will they become Descartes or Kant of XXIst or XXth century? Avrum Stroll considers only Wittgenstein to be a probable applicant to the status [31, p. 251]. There are four or five criteria for greatness: a philosopher should enrich all or nearly all the spheres of the discipline; he should be original; should leave an inheritance the contents and the quantity of which give birth to commercial corps of commentary; should influence the associated disciplines in the humanities in such a way, that if he hadn't leaved, the branch would have been quite different. It's clear, that Plato, Aristotle, Hume and Kant satisfy all those demands. Descartes didn't promote all the fields, but still he satisfies some other criteria. Wittgenstein is the strongest of the philosophers-analysts so far as king of the whole generation, and like antique classics and like Kant is the product of an enormous sub literature of commentaries: by Max Black, Garth Hallet, Eike von Savigny, Gordon Baker and P.M.S.Hacker, among others. Von Wright, widely recognized as a careful judicious historian of philosophy, says this explicitly that the later Wittgenstein “hasn't any ancestors in the history of thought. His work signals a radical departure from previous existing paths of philosophy”.

References

1. *The Story of Analytic Philosophy: Plot and Heroes*. Eds A. Biletski, A.Matar. London, Routledge Publ., 1998. 276 p.
2. *A Companion to Analytic Philosophy*. Eds A. P.Martinich, David Sosa. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2001. 510 p.
3. Sellars W. *Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes*. London, 1967. 238 p.
4. *Bertrand Russell and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy*. Eds Monk Ray, Palmer Anthony. Bristol, Thoemmes Press Publ., 1996. 400 p.
5. Dummett M. *Origins of Analytical Philosophy*. Duckworth, 1993. VII+182 p.
6. Hurka T. Moore in the Middle. *Ethics*, 2003, no. 113, pp. 599–630.
7. Follesdal Dagfinn. Analytic Philosophy: What is it and why should one engage in it? Ed. by H.J.Glock. *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford, Blackwell Publ., 1997, pp. 1–16.
8. Wheeler S. *Deconstruction as Analytic Philosophy*. Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press Publ., 2000. 312 p.
9. *A House Divided: Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy*. Ed. by C.G.Prado. Humanity Books Publ., 2003. 329 p.
10. Hacker P.M.S. *Wittgenstein's Place in Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford, Blackwell Publ., 1996. 368 p.
11. Sluga H. What Has History to Do with Me? Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy. *Inquiry*, 1998, vol. 41, no. 1, pp. 119–121.
12. Sluga H. Frege on Meaning. Ed. by H.J.Glock. *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford, Blackwell Publ., 1997, pp. 17–34.

13. *Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein*. Ed. by W.W.Tait. Chicago, Open Court Publ., 1997. 300 p.
14. Gottfried G. Frege, Lotze, and the Continental roots of Early Analytic Philosophy. E. by E. Reck E. *From Frege to Wittgenstein: Perspectives on Early Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford, Oxford University Press Publ., 2002, pp. 39–51.
15. Hacker P. M. S. The Rise of Twentieth Century Analytic Philosophy. Ed. by H. J. Glock. *The Rise of Analytic Philosophy*. Oxford, Blackwell Publ., 1997. pp. 51–76.
16. Milkov N. *What is analytic philosophy?* Available at: <http://kw.uni-paderborn.de/fileadmin/kw/institute/Philosophie/Personal/Milkov/analytic2.pdf> (accessed 22.11.2016).
17. *Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy*, vol 22. Berlin, New York, de Gruyter, 1999. xii+162 p.
18. *Frege: Importance and Legacy*. Ed. by M. Schirn. Berlin, De Gruyter Publ., 1996. VI+466 p.
19. Soames S. *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton, Princeton University Press Publ., 2003. 432 p.
20. Rorty R. *Consequences of Pragmatism*. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1982. xlvii+237 p.
21. *Continental Philosophy in the 20th Century*, vol. VIII. Ed. by R. Kearney. London, New York, Routledge, 1994. 524 p.
22. *Classics of analytical metaphysics*. Ed. by Blackman Larry Lee. Lanham, University Press of America Publ., 1984. v+287 p.
23. Rorty R. The Historiography of Philosophy: Four Genres. *Philosophy in History*. Eds by R. Rorty, J. B. Schneewind, Q. Skinner. Cambridge, 1984, pp. 49–75.
24. *Analytic philosophy and history of philosophy*. Eds T. Sorell, G. A. J. Rogers. New York, Oxford University Press, 2005. 240 p.
25. Strawson P. F. *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'*. London, Methuen, 1966. 296 p.
26. *The Pragmatic Turn in Philosophy: Contemporary Engagement between Analytic and Continental Thought*. Eds W. Egginton, M. Sandbothe. Albany, State University of New York Press Publ., 2004. 262 p.
27. McDowell J. *Mind and world*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press Publ., 1994. 224 p.
28. Brandom R. B. *Making it explicit: Reasoning, representing, and discursive commitments*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press Publ., 1994. 741 p.
29. Redding P. *Analytic Philosophy and the return of Hegelian thought*. Cambridge University Press Publ., 2007. 264 p.
30. Cohen L.G. *The dialogue of Reason: An analysis of Analytical Philosophy*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986. X+237 p.
31. Stroll A. Today and Tomorrow. *Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy*. Columbia University Press Publ., New York, 2000, pp. 246–270.

For citation: Kolesnikov A.S. Analytic Philosophy: Compelled Reflection. *Vestnik SPbSU. Philosophy and Conflict Studies*, 2017, vol. 33, issue 2, pp. 172–181. DOI: 10.21638/11701/spbu17.2017.204

Received: 23.11.2016

Accepted: 15.12.2016